Environment
Fiona Reynolds is chair of think tank Green Alliance and master of Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge
ONE thing will shape the UK’s physical environment more than any other after Brexit: what happens to farming. The UK loves its countryside, yet what is there today has been influenced by 40 years of European policy as well as the toil of generations of farmers.
Yes, sheep are still farmed in the hills and grain in the lowlands, but the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has changed the countryside – not for the better.
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There are glimpses of a post-Brexit future: environment secretary Michael Gove proposed funding farmers who create public benefits such as hedgerows and woods. But questions remain. First, how much money will such ideas get? The CAP dispenses £3.5 billion a year in the UK – £800 million of it on “green” and non-food production farm support. So anything less than £1 billion for environmental improvements would be business as usual. Far more is needed to see a real boost.
Second, what rules will apply to farmers who don’t enhance the environment? For example, there is no clue yet how tough the proposed curbs on pesticide or fertiliser use will be. In another 40 years, the UK countryside may look very different. Whether it is better for nature, is more attractive and has greater public access depends on the framework established before Brexit.
Immigration
Jim Al-Khalili is a professor of theoretical physics and chair in the public engagement in science at the University of Surrey, UK
UNCERTAINTY over immigration has been having a detrimental impact on UK research as well as recruitment to the National 91ɫƬ Service. The lack of clarity on EU nationals’ work and residency rights has created uncertainty and fear, deterring some researchers and medical staff from coming to the UK and persuading others to leave. A transition deal may ease this situation for a while, but it is a patch at best.
Ultimately, the UK must quickly rebuild its reputation as a welcoming place that is open for business and able to compete for the mobile international talent it needs. If it doesn’t, its position as a world leader in science, medical research and technological innovation is at risk. There could be disastrous economic impacts.
“It is important for the UK to rebuild its reputation as a welcoming nation for the global talent it needs”
The government needs to do two things: in the short term, it must amend visa rules and improve the message it sends migrants to provide confidence during the Brexit transition. Then, in the longer term, it needs to create a streamlined immigration system that facilitates frictionless movement to support research, innovation and healthcare.
Food
Rosalind Sharpe is at the Centre for Food Policy at City, University of London
BREXIT will profoundly affect the UK’s food supply – albeit more in terms of food governance than food security. Governance refers to the rules and standards that maintain the safety and quality of the food the nation eats. These complex arrangements depend on those people working in environmental health, trading standards, public analysis, veterinary and crop science, plant breeding, pharmaceuticals, food technology and more.
The governance “food web” has long been enmeshed in rules developed by European authorities, with UK input. It must now be disentangled, given extra staff and resources, and redesigned so it can function outside the EU. Positive signs include the creation of 1200 posts at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs since June 2016 and a pledge to “optimise sustainable food production”. But a promised 25-year food plan was shelved, and there has been scant reference to food in Brexit plans.
Many fear that trade deals could allow imports from places with lower standards and cheaper labour. If that happens, many UK farmers will face ruin. In food terms, Brexit requires policy-making that is visionary and meticulous, taking in all these factors, the big picture and the long-term view, but also paying attention to practicalities and human-scale impacts.
Aviation
Paul Marks is a technology, aviation and space-flight writer in London
APTLY, perhaps, for a business that plies the frigid stratosphere, civil aviation may feel the cold breeze of Brexit sooner than most industries. Because the UK has to renegotiate various pan-European aviation agreements, it could be hit on a number of fronts, from confidence in booking flights to compensating passengers for delayed journeys to the right to fly over other nations.
While many tough talks are still needed to sort out these issues, there is one overarching Brexit pledge that the government would be wise to make good on soon: negotiators should focus on ensuring that the UK remains a member of the European Aviation Safety Agency. Based in Germany, EASA tests and certifies the airworthiness of planes allowed to fly in the EU. As Europe’s version of the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), it long ago subsumed the expertise behind that certification process from member states.
It would make no sense for the UK to create a competing safety regulator of its own when the best it could do is replicate EASA regulations, says the UK Civil Aviation Authority. Between them, the FAA and EASA have engineered a global aviation industry that is enjoying an unprecedented period of safety: that is a prize nobody should be willing to risk slipping away.
On a related note, European plane-maker Airbus, whose wings are made in the UK, worries how Brexit will affect its supply chains. Reassurances must be a priority.
Nuclear Oversight
Tom Greatrex is the chief executive of the Nuclear Industry Association
OVER four decades, the complex relationships, arrangements and processes tied to the UK’s membership of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) have been agreed and honed. Under Euratom’s umbrella come the inspection of fissile material, the coordination of fusion research, the facilitation of overseas trade and oversight of the European common nuclear market for staff, services and material.
Almost by accident, and with seemingly little grasp of the scale and scope of the task of recreating this set-up and renegotiating treaties, the government decided to leave Euratom alongside its EU exit.
It is now engaged in the unenviable task of trying to disentangle and replicate 45 years of collaboration.
The government has to show the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the UK can take on Euratom’s inspections role. It must then negotiate nuclear cooperation agreements with third countries to replace those the UK is party to as a Euratom member, and to agree funding arrangements for future fusion research and a future trading relationship with the EU.
All of this will take time, people and resources. With no deal with the IAEA yet – and that is the basis for much of the rest of what must be put in place – there is a real danger of time running out.
The priority must be for the Brexit transition period to also apply to Euratom.
Climate Change
Eloise Scotford is a professor of environmental law at University College London
MANY areas of environmental law are poised to be left diluted or with governance gaps on Brexit day. Climate change is different. The UK has its own world-leading legislation in the Climate Change Act 2008, which sets an ambitious agenda for action on the issue.
However, there is a Brexit catch. Many of the government’s current initiatives for meeting carbon budgets involve implementing EU measures and schemes, most notably through membership of its . A critical task for the government is to work out how to maintain ambitions allied to EU initiatives so its domestic climate commitments are met. Whether the UK will remain a member of this trading system is a fraught issue that needs resolving, for UK industry participants as well as for the scheme’s integrity.
“The UK has its own world-leading climate change legislation. However, there is a Brexit catch”
Beyond Brexit, climate campaigners want stronger commitments in light of the Paris Agreement’s goals to limit the global average temperature rise to 1.5°C and to achieve a “balance” of greenhouse gas emissions and removals by the second half of the century. The UK was an effective partner within EU institutions to inform this global vision. Brexit means it must re-establish its climate diplomacy with the EU and the rest of the world.
The government culled its Department of Energy and Climate Change, its official carbon-cutting plan is out of date and questions are mounting about how it will fill the void of EU climate policy post-Brexit. There is lots to be done before the UK quits the EU.
Energy security
Paul Ekins is a professor of resources and environment policy, and director of the Institute for Sustainable Resources at University College London
A key issue still to be resolved is the UK’s relationship with mainland Europe on energy. Before the Brexit vote, the direction of travel was pretty clear. The UK would be part of the , a process of increasing integration of energy systems in member states, especially in electricity. This would lead to increasing liberalisation and convergence of continental electricity systems, very much along the lines of energy market reforms pioneered in the UK in the 1990s.
Integration would be reinforced and enabled by investment in systems to allow energy to be easily exchanged across borders. Doing so would help to balance and make best use of the increasing output from intermittent renewables across the EU.
Some of this new investment is going ahead, Brexit or no Brexit, but full integration will depend on the terms of the final deal. At stake is the whole issue of whether the UK will be able to fully benefit from the lower electricity prices and greater security of supply that a fully integrated, Europe-wide electricity grid would offer.
The UK can “take back control” of its energy system, but there will be a price to pay: it will be unable to maximise the benefits it can get from selling its abundant renewable energy – or from importing renewable power when UK wind and solar systems aren’t producing.
