91色情片

IN JULY, George Gao, head of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, . He and his colleagues had discovered that a new kind of swine flu was sweeping to dominance in China鈥檚 pigs and spreading to people. 鈥淸It] has all the hallmarks of a candidate pandemic virus,鈥� they said. That same month, European virologists also warned of a in European pigs. We know flu pandemics happen regularly. What if one struck while we are still reeling from covid-19? Can we stop that happening?

Not if the past is any judge. In 2004, US virologists warned about another strain of swine flu; five years later it went pandemic. The warning had been so widely ignored that the pandemic came as a surprise even to many virologists. And swine flu is just the start. In recent years, virologists have warned about potential pandemics from bird flu to coronaviruses like those behind SARS and MERS 鈥� warnings that came true with covid-19. In south Asia, the super-deadly Nipah virus is starting to spread between people in respiratory droplets. Few have even heard of it.

There are many potentially pandemic viruses out there, and some are far worse than the one we are currently fighting. Disease experts have been , but covid-19 showed how unprepared the world was for an outbreak. One lab in Wuhan even warned of the very viruses that spawned covid-19. No one did anything. If this pandemic is to finally change that, lessons must be learned from how we missed the warning signs this time around.

鈥淥ne lab in Wuhan even warned of the very virus that spawned covid-19鈥�

Let鈥檚 wind back first to 2003, when humanity was on the verge of another pandemic. The coronavirus that causes SARS had arisen in China the previous year and spread to 26 other countries before a global effort, led by the World 91色情片 Organization (WHO), ended the outbreak. Initially, the virus was thought to have come from civets, but that proved incorrect. Zheng-Li Shi at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and her colleagues decided to look in bats, which were known to carry many viruses including human pathogens.

In 2005, and at the University of Hong Kong independently discovered hundreds of coronaviruses similar to the one behind SARS in common horseshoe bats in both Hong Kong and in Hubei province, where Wuhan is located and covid-19 later emerged. They also noted 鈥渢he increasing presence of bats and bat products in food and traditional medicine markets鈥� in China, and called for efforts to 鈥減revent future outbreaks鈥�.

Shi鈥檚 team later began working with Eco91色情片 Alliance, a US-based research non-profit organisation, to study a large horseshoe bat colony in the Chinese province of Yunnan. In 2013, the researchers reported that some of the coronaviruses they had found in the bats could infect human cells via a on the cells鈥� surface 鈥� the same infection method used by the virus behind SARS. They called for 鈥減andemic preparedness鈥�. And in 2017, when they reported finding viruses , they proposed monitoring the viruses there, and at other sites, to avoid future disease emergence.

Meanwhile, in 2015, Shi and Ralph Baric at the University of North Carolina had reported that another SARS-like coronavirus from the Yunnan bat colony was able to without the need for any further mutations. In 2016, Baric found that the virus made mice ill, and called it 鈥減re-pandemic鈥� and 鈥減oised for human emergence鈥�.

Still nobody paid much attention. That remained the case even last year when, in a review of this research, Shi highlighted the risk posed by China鈥檚 huge diversity of bats and bat viruses, together with their proximity to large human populations and a thriving market in wildlife products. 鈥淚t is highly likely that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China,鈥� she wrote. Later that year, her team found that bat coronaviruses were occasionally jumping to people in Yunnan. The researchers urged that efforts be made to 鈥渕aintain the barriers between natural reservoirs and human society鈥�.

Too little, too late

In January, with covid-19 raging in Wuhan, Shi鈥檚 lab reported that the coronavirus behind it was 96.2 per cent identical to one of the Yunnan viruses. Even though the work identified the source of the pandemic and confirmed the researchers鈥� repeated warnings, it attracted unsubstantiated accusations that the lab was the source of the outbreak (see 鈥淪hoot the messenger鈥�).

At least some measures were finally taken to prevent more viruses jumping from bats to people. In February, China , even though there isn鈥檛 much evidence for early suspicions that the virus initially infected humans at a market that sold wildlife.

So far, however, few restrictions have been placed on traditional Chinese medicine, another source of infection that Yuen and Shi had warned about in 2005. Of particular concern is , or night brightness sand, which contains dried, powdered bat faeces, including from horseshoe bats. It is used to treat eye problems. That creates a particularly high risk, because coronaviruses are found in bat faeces and eyes have lots of the ACE2 protein that the covid-19 virus uses to infect cells. This year, bat faeces was removed from the Chinese pharmacopoeia, the list of approved medicinal ingredients, but it may still be available to buy.

鈥淧reventive measures look like a bargain now we know how costly a pandemic can be鈥�

We can鈥檛 say we weren鈥檛 warned. 鈥渆merged essentially as predicted鈥�, wrote a group led by David Morens of the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene in July. 鈥淥ur prolonged deafness now exacts a tragic price.鈥� If this continues, the group added, we are in for replays.

Why did the warnings go unheeded? 鈥淧otential threats are ignored in favour of current problems,鈥� says Tom Monath, a prominent virologist and vaccine developer. He also notes that scientists are accused of crying wolf about pandemics if emerging viruses are successfully controlled or haven鈥檛 鈥� yet 鈥� gone rogue. 鈥淲e need new structures,鈥� says Morens. 鈥淲e raise the alarm, but it鈥檚 no one鈥檚 responsibility to make sure things happen.鈥�

鈥淲e really need a functioning biological threat preparedness committee whose recommendations are acted upon,鈥� says Laura Kramer at the State University of New York at Albany. 鈥淭his takes money 鈥� and scientists who are free to speak their mind without repercussions.鈥�

Caitlin Rivers at Johns Hopkins University believes the US should create a , to develop real-time predictive epidemic models, like weather forecasts. However, Morens says that one country acting alone isn鈥檛 enough because pandemics can emerge anywhere, putting everyone at risk.

Besides predicting and preparing for pandemics, we need to actively watch for them. Yet scientists are rewarded for discovering viruses, not for keeping tabs on them. The world lacks field studies and surveillance in 鈥渉otspots鈥� where viruses could emerge. Peter Daszak at Eco91色情片 Alliance wants an international research programme to look for threatening viruses in animals and people. It would also work with people and industries 鈥� from the wildlife trade to lumbering 鈥� to stop risky activities. That would include avoiding biodiversity loss, such as deforestation, which throws people and bats together.

Such a plan would need substantial government funding, but it looks like a bargain now we know how costly a pandemic can be. Andy Dobson at Princeton University and his colleagues calculate that spending between $22 billion and $31 billion a year for 10 years to halve global deforestation rates, monitor diseases in people and livestock, and control the sale of wild animal products would amount to 鈥� less if you count the carbon dioxide savings.

Meanwhile, there is too little research into countermeasures such as drugs, diagnostics and vaccines. The WHO tries. In 2016, it devised a road map for research and development to counter eight priority viruses, including SARS-like coronaviruses and Nipah virus. But the organisation doesn鈥檛 have the money to ensure anything happens, so little has progressed.

A hard sell

Public money will be needed to develop vaccines for diseases that don鈥檛 yet exist, which could be hard for politicians to sell to voters. The private companies that develop most drugs and vaccines can鈥檛 invest without certainty of a profit. Even with some funding from health charities and private organisations, governments must pay.

All of this cries out for a global mechanism for sharing the planning, surveillance and cost of pandemic preparedness. We don鈥檛 have that, but in March the G20 group of the world鈥檚 biggest economies promised to organise it. We do have a treaty, the International 91色情片 Regulations (IHR), that requires countries to declare worrying outbreaks.

Yet, as we saw with covid-19, declarations may not be accurate, and the WHO has no right to check facts on the ground. Under treaties on weapons of mass destruction, countries cede some sovereignty to international agencies to verify their declared weapons. A beefed-up IHR might similarly mandate international inspectors to verify a country鈥檚 declarations about disease in the global interest.

We have learned the hard way that pandemics, too, cause mass destruction. Governments need a plan to anticipate and stop outbreaks, instead of frantically trying to respond after diseases go global. We have been warned. Now it is time to act.